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PELATIAH WEBSTER
THE ARCHITECT OF OUR FEDERAL CQNSTITUTION
During the present session of Congress, a memorial will be
presented whose purpose is twofold: first, to place in the hands
of Congress the data for a new and pivotal chapter in the his-
tory of the constitution that will impress upon succeeding
generations the all-important fact that every basic principle
which differentiates our existing federal system from all that
have preceded it was a part of a single invention struck off at a
given time by the brain of one man; second, to press upon Con-
gress the long, neglected duty of honoring, by an appropriate
monument, the memory of an American statesman and patriot
who has made a larger personal contribution to the science of
government than any other one individual in the history of man-
kind. From the data thus to be presented it will clearly appear
that among our nation-builders, Pelatiah Webster stands second
to Washington alone. All the world understands in a vague and
general way that certain path-breaking principles entered into
the structure of our second Federal Constitution of 1789, which
differentiate it from all other systems of federal government that
have preceded it. M. de Tocqueville gave formal expression to
that understanding when he said: "This constitution, which may
at first be confounded with federal constitutions that have pre-
ceded it, rests in truth upon a wholly novel theory which may be con-
sidered a great discovery in modern political science. 'In the confed-
erations that preceded the American Constitution of 1789, the
allied states, for a common object, agreed to obey the injunctions
of a federal government; but they reserved to themselves the right
of ordaining and enforcing the execution of the laws of the Union.
The American states, which combined in 1789, agreed that the
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federal government should not only dictate, but should execute
its own enactments. In both cases the right is the same, but
the exercise of the right is different; and this difference produced
the most momentous consequences. 1 " Mr. Gladstone simply re-
iterated that idea when he said: "As the British constitution is
the most subtile organism which has proceeded from progressive
history, so the American constitution is the most wonderful work
ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of
man." That master of, the history of English institutions per-
fectly understood that as our state constitutions are mere repro-
ductions, mere evolutions from the English political system, so
our second federal constitution is a new invention "struck off at
a given time by the brain and purpose of man." That invention
of a new type of federal government, embodying, as Tocqueville
said, "a wholly novel theory," is so unique that it can no more
be confounded with any preceding federal government than a
modern mogul engine can be confounded with an ancient stage
coach. Did that wonderful invention, which has produced such
momentous consequences, have a personal author, like all other
inventions; or was it revealed at the same moment, and in some
mysterious way, to a large number of persons, thinking and act-
ing in isolation? Upon that humanly impossible or miraculous
theory, historians of our existing constitutions have attempted to
explain the origin of the unique plan of federal government pre-
sented to the Convention which sat at Philadelphia during the
117 days that intervened between May 14 and September 17,
1787. After deducting recesses and holidays there could not
have been more than 8o working days. No one has ever con-
tended, or can ever contend, that the great invention in question
was made after the Convention met, for the simple and conclusive
reason that it was the basis of all the "plans" save one, carefully
constructed beforehand, out of which the constitution was
evolved. Five and only five "plans," all pre-constructed, were sub-
mitted to the Convention, viz.: the Virginia plan, the Charles
Pinckney plan, the Connecticut plan, the Alexander Hamilton
plan, and the New Jersey plan. As the last only proposed a re-
vision of the Articles of Confederation it may be dismissed from
consideration. There were but four plans in which proposals for
a new system of federal goverment were embodied, each resting
upon the "wholly novel theory" which has produced "the most
momentous consequences." A distinguished specialist has well
i. Democracy in America, Vol. x, pp. 198-199.
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said that "the Virginia plan became the bed-rock of the consti-
tution." That plan, which embodied perfectly every phase of
the great invention, was drafted by Madison who began his prep-
aration for the labors of the Convention at least a year before it
met. 3 In December, 1786, we find him in active correspondence
with Jefferson, then at Paris, as to the Virginia plan. 4 The
marvel is that the historians who are supposed to have explored
the sources have never taken the pains to ask this simple and in-
evitable question: From what common source did the draftsmen of
the four plans draw the path-breaking invention which was the
foundation of all of them ? Let it be said to the honor of those
draftsmen that no one of them ever claimed to be the author of
that invention. Neither Madison, nor Charles Pinckney, nor
Sherman, nor Ellsworth, nor Hamilton, nor any of their
biographers, so far as the writer is informed, ever set up such
a claim in behalf of any one of them. The answer to "the
simple and inevitable question" just propounded is this: The
common source from which the draftsmen of the four plans
drew the path-breaking invention underlying them all was "A
Dissertation on the Political Union and Constitution of the Thir-
teen United States of North America," published at Philadelphia
by Pelatiah Webster, February i6, 1783, and there republished by
him with copiotus notes in 1791. In that immortal paper, whose
lightest words are weighty, he gave to the world, as his personal
contribution to the science of government, and as an entirety
worked out in great detail, the "wholly novel theory" of federal
government upon which reposes the existing constitution of the
United States.
Prior to the date in question, no single element of that theory
had ever been propounded by anyone. In a note appended to the
republication of 179 1, the great inventor gives the following ac-
count of the circumstances under which the invention was made:
"At the time when this Dissertation was written (February i6,
1783) the defects and insufficiency of the Old Federal Constitu-
tion was universally felt and acknowledged, it was manifest, not
only that the internal police, justice, security, and peace of the
States could never be preserved under it, but the finances and
2. Meigs, The Growth of the Const. in the Fed. Con. of 1787, p. 17.
3. See Rives' Life and Times of Madison, Vol. ii, p. 208. "Prepara-
tions of Madison for Labors of Federal Convention."
4. See letter of Jefferson to Madison of Dec. i6, 1786, in Jefferson's Cor-
respondence, by T. J. Randolph, Vol. ii, pp. 64-65.
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public credit would necessarily become so embarrassed, preca-
rious, and void of support that no public movement, which de-
pended on the revenue, could be managed with any effectual
certainty; but tho' the public mind was under full conviction of
all these mischiefs, and was contemplating a remedy, yet the
public ideas were not at all concentrated, much less arranged
into any new system or form of government, which would obvi-
ate these evils. Under these circumstances I offered this Dis-
sertation to the public, how far the principles of it were adopted
or rejected in the New Constitution, which was four years after-
wards (September 17, 1787) formed by the Convention, and since
ratified by all the States, is obvious to every one." At the same
time he added: "I was fully of opinion (tho' the sentiment at
that time would not very well bear) that it would be ten times
easier to form a new constitution than to mend the old one. I
therefore sat myself down to sketch out the leading principles of
that political constitution, which I thought necessary to the pre-
servation and happiness of the United States of America, which
are comprised in this Dissertation. I hope the reader will please
to consider that these are the original thoughts of a private individ-
ual, dictated by the nature of the subject only, long before the
important theme became the great object of discussion, in the
most dignified and important assembly, which ever sat or decided
in America." The great inventor perfectly understood the
merits of his own case which he thus stated with the lucidity of
a Greek and the terseness of a Roman. As early as 1781 Pela-
tiah Webster was the first to propose to the people of the United
States, in one of his financial essays published at Philadelphia, the
calling of "A Continental Convention" for the making of a new
constitution. In bearing testimony to that fact Madison said
that Pelatiah Webster, "after discussing the fiscal system of the
United States, and suggesting, among other remedial provisions,
one including a national bank, remarks that the authority of
Congress is very inadequate to the performance of their duties;
and this indicates the necessity of their calling a Continental
Convention for the express purpose of ascertaining, defining, en-
larging and limiting, the duties and powers of their constitu-
tion."5 Two years after he had thus sounded the tocsin for the
States to assemble, he made the invention and published to the
world, in detail, the plan upon which the constitution was to be
formed. 6 While the historian Bancroft failed to appreciate the
5. The Madison Papers (1841) Vol. ii., pp. 7o6-7.
6. It was replied to by Roger Sherman.
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stupendous importance of his work, he frankly admits that he
actually performed it when he says: "The public mind was
ripening for a transition from a confederation to a real govern-
ment. Just at this time Pelatiah Webster, a graduate of Yale
college, in a dissertation published at Philadelphia, proposed for
the legislature of the United States a congress of two houses,
which should have ample authority for making laws 'of general
necessity and utility,' and enforcing them as well on individuals as
on states. He further suggested not only heads of excutive depart-
ments, but judges of law and chancery. The tract awakened so
much attention that it was reprinted in Hartford, and called
forth a reply."1  Pelatiah Webster needs the admissions neither
of Madison nor of Bancroft to establish his title to the author-
ship of the "wholly novel theory" now embodied in the constitu-
tion of the United States, because his title rests upon contem-
porary documentary evidence as clear and convincing as that
upon which rests Jefferson's title to the authorship of the Declar-
ation of Independence. If that be true, then he has made a
larger personal contribution to the science of government than
any other one individual in the history of mankind. Among our
nation-builders he stands second to Washington alone. And yet
among them all he only has been neglected and forgotten by his
countrymen, not through any conscious omission, but because of
a careless historical scholarship which has failed to present his
great achievement in its true light. That conviction has im-
pelled the undersigned, who have devoted more than thirty years
to the special study of the origin and growth of our constitutional
systems, state and federal, to present to Congress, very briefly,
the historical date upon which Pelatiah Webster's right to im-
mortality depends. He it was who first suggested the separate
existence of the two houses of Congress when, in 1783, he said:
"That the Congress shall consist of two chambers, an upper and
a lower house, or senate and commons, with the concurrence of
both necessary to every act; and that every State send one or
more delegates to each house; this will subject every act to two
discussions before two distinct chambers of men equally qualified
for the debate, equally masters of the subject, and of equal
authority in the decision." Prior to that utterance no federal
assembly, ancient or modern, had ever consisted of two chambers;
no one had ever suggested such an idea. If, after a careful ex-
amination of all the facts, the Congress shall deem the architect
7. History of the Const. of the U. S., Vol. x, p. 86.
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of our federal constitution unworthy of a monument, it is hoped
that the memorial presented in his behalf may be entered in its
records so that succeeding generations may determine for them-
selves whether or no his work has been justly judged.
I.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS PRIOR TO AND INCLUDING THAT OF 1776.
From the days of the Greek Leagues down to the making of
the second constitution of the United States, all federal govern-
ments had been constructed on a single plan at once clumsy and
inefficient. The most perfect of the Greek Leagues was the
Achaian, of which the framers really knew nothing, as we learn
from Madison who tells us in the Federalist (Xviii) that: "Could
the interior structure and regular operations of the Achaian
Leagues be ascertained, it is probable that more light might be
thrown by it on the science of federal government than by any
like experiments with which we are acquainted " The coveted
knowledge was not accessible because the historical scholars who
have since passed beyond the Greece of Thucydides into the
Greece of Polybios, who have passed beyond the period in which
the independent city-commonwealth was the dominant political
idea into the later and less brilliant period of Hellenic freedom
occupied by the history of Greek federalism, had not then com-
pleted their investigations, only fully worked out in very recent
years. Such scanty knowledge as the framers did possess of
Greek federalism seems to have been drawn from the little work
of the Abb6 deMably, Observations sur l'Histoire de la Grace (Fed-
eralist xviii). The only federal governments with whose internal
organizations the builders of our federal republic were really
familiar, and whose histories had any practical effect upon their
work, were those that had grown up between the Low-Dutch
communities at the mouth of the Rhine and between the High-
Dutch communities in the mountains of Switzerland, and upon
the plains of Germany (Federalist xix, xx). Down to the making
of the second constitution of the United States, the Confederation
of Swiss Cantons, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, and
the German Confederation really represented the total advance
made by the modern world in the structure of federal govern-
ments. Such advance was embodied in the idea of a federal
system made up of a union of states, cities or districts, repre-
sentatives from which composed a single federal assembly whose
limited powers could be brought to bear not upon individual
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citizens but only upon cities or states as such. The fundamental
principle upon which all such fabrics rested was the requisition
system, under which the federal assembly was only endowed
with the power to make requisitions for men and money upon
the states or cities composing the league for federal purposes,
while the states, alone, in their corporal capacity possessed the
power to execute them. The initial effort of the English colonies
in America along the path of federal union ended with the
making of the first constitution of the United States embodied
in the Articles of Confederation. Up to that point nothing new
had been achieved; the fruit of the first effort was simply a con-
federation, constructed upon a plan over two thousand years old,
which could only deal through the requisition system with states
as states. The confederation possessed no power (i) to operate
directly upon the individual citizen; (2) it had no independent
power of taxation; (3) the federal head was not divided into
three departments: executive, legislative and judicial; (4) the
federal assembly consisted of one chamber instead of two. The
lack of power to levy and collect for itself federal or national
taxes rendered our first federal government preeminently a
failure as a financial system dependent as it was upon the wills
of thirteen independent legislatures. 8
II.
PELATIAH WEBSTER'S INVENTION AND THE SECOND CONSTITU-
TION OF 1787.
The most scientific writer upon finance during the Revolu-
tionary War was Pelatiah Webster whose essays upon that subject
fill a volume. 9 He was born at Lebanon, Connecticut, in 1725,
and graduated at Yale College in 1746. In 1755 he removed to
Philadelphia, where he became a prosperous merchant, and in
due time an ardent supporter of the patriot cause in the War of
the Revolution, aiding with pen and purse. He was captured by
the British, and, on account of his ardor was imprisoned for four
months. As early as October, 1776, he began to write on the
currency, and in 1779 he commenced the publication in Phila-
delphia of a series of "Essays on Free Trade and Finance." He
was sufficiently inportant as a political economist to be consulted
by the Continental Congress as to the resources of the country.
8. See Pelatiah Webster's masterful analysis of the Articles of Confed-
eration contained in his Notes published in 1791.
9. The second edition of 1791 was "Printed and sold by Joseph
Crukshank, No. 91 High Street," Philadelphia.
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His financial studies soon convinced him that no stable fiscal
system could be established until the then existing federal
government was wiped out and superseded by one endowed with
independent taxing power. Therefore, as early as 1781, in one
of his financial essays, he made the first public call for the "Con-
tinental Convention," referred to by Madison, to be armed with
power to devise an adequate system of federal government.
Having thus taken the first step, he set himself to work to for-
mulate in advance such an adequate system as the Convention
should adopt, whenever it might meet.
In the great tract published at Philadelphia, February 16,
1783, we have photographed for us the workings of his mind as
he moved along paths never trod before. He sounded the key-
note when he declared: "They (the supreme power) must
therefore of necessity be vested with a power of taxation. I
know this is a most important and weighty truth, a dreadful
engine of oppression, tyranny, and injury, when ill used; yet,
from the necessity of the case it must be admitted. For to give
a supreme authority a power of making contracts, without any
power of payment; of appointing officers, civil and military with-
out money to pay them; a power to build ships, without any
money to do it with; a power of emitting money, without any
power to redeem it or of borrowing money without any power to
make payment, etc.; such solecisms in government are so nuga-
tory and absurd, that I really think to offer further argument
on the subject would be to insult the understanding of my
readers. To make all these payments dependent on the votes
of thirteen popular assemblies, who will undertake to judge of
the propriety of every contract and every occasion of money,
and grant or withhold supplies according to their opinion,
whilst at the same time the operations of the whole may be
stopped by the vote of a single one of them, is absurd." Thus
Pelatiah Webster proposed the existing system of federal taxa-
tion, then entirely new, to the world; thus he proposed that the
ancient system of requisitions, resting on the taxing power of
the states, should be superseded by a federal or national taxation
extending to every citizen, directly or indirectly. Instead of
the lifeless system of absurdity embodied in the Articles of Con-
federation, he proposed to substitute a self-executing and
self-sustaining national system, based on the following propo-
sitions, stated in his own language: "The supreme authority of
any state must have power enough to effect the ends of its
appointment, otherwise these ends cannot be answered and
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effectually secured. . . I begin with my first and great
principle, viz.: that the constitution must vest powers in every
department sufficient to secure and make effectual the ends of it.
The supreme authority must have the power of making war and
peace; of appointing armies and navies; of appointing officers
both civil and military; of making contracts; of emitting, coin-
ing and borrowing money; of regulating trade; of making treaties
with foreign powers; of establishing post-offices;'and in short of
doing everything which the well-being of the Commonwealth
may require, and which is not compatible to any particular
State, all of which require money, and cannot possibly be made
effectual without it. . . . This tax can be laid by the
supreme authority much more conveniently than by the partic-
ular Assemblies, and would in no case be subject to their repeals
or modifications; and of course the public credit would never be
dependent on, or liable to bankruptcy by the humors of any
particular assembly. . . . The delegates which are to form
that august body, which are to hold and exercise the supreme
authority, ought to be appointed by the States in any manner
they please."
In formulating his conclusions as to the supremacy of federal
law acting directly on all citizens, he said: "x. No laws of any
State whatever, which do not carry in them a force which
extends to their effectual and final execution, can afford a certain
or sufficient security to the subject; this is too plain to need proof.
2. Laws or ordinances of any kind (especially of august bodies
of high dignity and consequence) which fail of execution are much
worse than none; they weaken the government; expose it to
contempt. . . . A government which is but half executed,
or whose operations may all be stopped by a single vote, is the
most dangerous of all institutions. . . . Further I propose
that if the execution of any act or ordinance of the supreme
authority shall be opposed by force in any of the States (which
God forbid!) it shall be lawful for Congress to 8end into such a
State a sufficient force to suppress it. On the whole, I take it
that the very existence and use of our Union effectuall3 depends
on the full energy and final effect of the laws made to support it;
and therefore I sacrifice all other considerations to this energy and
effect and if our Union is not worth this purchase we must give it
up; the nature of the thing does not admit any other alternative."
In these ringling terms was announced the path-breaking
invention of a supreme and self-executing federal government
operating directly upon the citizen; an invention for which the
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world had been waiting for two thousand years; an invention of
which no trace nor hint is to be found in the constitutions of any of
the Teutonic Leagues, in the Articles of the Confederation, nor in the
prior utterances of any other man.
Having thus defined his fundamental concept of a federal
government operating directly on the citizen, the great one
boldly accepted the inevitable corollary that such a government
must be strictly organized and equipped with machinery adequate
to its ends; with the usual branches, executive, legislative and
judicial; with its army, its navy, its civil service, and all the
usual apparatus of a government, all operating directly upon
every citizen of the Union without any reference to the govern-
ment of the several States. No such federal government,
ancient or modern, had ever existed. As Montesquieu was the
first to point out the division of State powers into executive,
legislative and judicial, originated in that single State in Britain
we call England.' 0 From that single State the principle passed
into the single States of the American Union." I Pelatiah Web-
ster was the first to conceive of the application of the principle
of the division of powers to a federal State; he was the first to
propose that the federal head should be divided and then organ-
ized as the particular ones are into legislative, executive and
judicial. More than three years later, Jefferson endorsed that
idea by commending it to Madison.' 2 Having thus made his
second great invention, Webster proceeded to explain how the
three departments, executive, legislative and judicial, should be
organized. His idea was that the executive power should be
vested in a council of ministers to be grouped around a President
elected by Congress. On that subject he said: "These ministers
will of course have the best information, and most perfect
knowledge of the state of the Nation,' 3 as far as it relates to
their several departments, and will of course be able to give the
best information to Congress, in what manner any bill proposed
will affect the public interest in their several departments, which
will nearly comprehend the whole. The Financier manages the
whole subject of the revenues and expenditures; the Secretary
6f State takes knowledge of the general policy and internal
government; the Minister of Wa." presides in the whole business
io. Spirit of Laws, bk. xi, ch. 6.
xi. Federalist, XLVI.
12. In the letter written from Paris, December z6, r786, heretofore cited.
13. The creator of the national spirit spoke of the Nation and spelled it
with a capital N.
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of war and defence; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs regards
the whole state of the Nation, as it stands related to, or connected
with, all foreign powers. . . I would further propose that
the aforesaid great Ministers of State shall compose a Council of
State to whose numbers Congress may add three others, viz.:
one from New England, one from the Middle States and one
from the Southern States, one of which to be appointed President
by Congress."
To the organization of the legislative department Webster
gave elaborate consideration. Just as no prior federalgover'-
ment had ever been divided into three departments, so no prior
federal legislature had been divided into two houses. The one-
chamber body represented by the Continental Congress was the
type of every other federal assembly that bad ever preceded it.
As stated heretofore the path-breaker, looking to the English
bicameral system as it had reappeared in the several states, pro-
posed "That the Congress shall consist of two chambers, an
upper and lower house or senate and commons, with the .con-
currence of both necessary to every act; and that every State
send one or more delegates to each house; this will subject every
act to two discussions before two distinct chambers of men
equally qualified for the debate, equally masters of the subject,
and of equal authority in the decision." Citizens of the United
States, to whom such a division now seems a matter of course,
should remember that when Webster proposed it, it was an un-
precedented novelty in the history of the world, so far as federal
legislatures are concerned. After an elaborate discussion of the
qualifications of members of Congress, in which he sharply
assailed the then existing rule forbidding their reelection, he
proceeded to define a part of the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of the United States by saying "that the
supreme authority should be vested with powers to terminate
and finally decide controversies arising between different
States." He also said "To these I should add judge of law and
chancery."
Thus the entire federal judicial system was distinctly out-
lined. Above all, he was careful to define the reserved powers
of the States. On that subject he said: "I propose further, that
the powers of Congress, and all the other departments acting
under them, shall be restricted to such matters only of general
necessity and utility to all the States as cannot come within the
jurisdiction of any particular State, or to which the authority of
any particular State is not competent; so that each particular
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State shall enjoy all sovereignty and supreme authority to all
intents and purposes, excepting only those high authorities and
powers by them delegated to Congress, for the purposes of the
general union." In that passage we have the first draft, and a
very complete one, of the Tenth Amendment. Thus it is a
matter of documentary evidence that every element that entered
into the "wholly novel theory which may be considered a great
discovery in modern political science," and which differentiates
our second federal constitution of 1789 from every other that
preceded it, was the deliberate invention of Pelatiah Webster
who announced to the world that theory, as an entirety, in
his epoch-making paper of February 16, 1783. Prior to that
date no federal government had ever existed (i) that operated
directly on the individual citizen; (2) no federal government
had ever been divided into three departments, executive, legis-
lative, and judicial; (3) no federal legislature had ever been
divided into an upper and lower house. There is no record,
there is not even a claim that, prior to that date, any human be-
ing had ever propounded any one of those principles in connec-
tion with a federal government. The great invento: was so
conscious at the time of the magnitude of his undertaking, that
he exclaimed as he wrote; "May almighty wisdom direct my pen
in this arduous discussion."
In conclusion he said; "This vast subject lies with mighty
weight on my mind, and I have bestowed on it my utmost
attention, and here offer the public the best thoughts and senti-
ments I am master of. I have not the vanity to imagine that
my sentiments may be adopted; I shall have all the reward I
wish or expect, if my dissertation shall throw any light on the
great subject, shall excite any emulation, and animate some
abler genius to form a plan of greater perfection, less objection-
able, and more useful." In his re-publication of 1791, he de-
scribed perfectly the circumstances under which the great inven-
tion of February 6, 1783, was made, when he said that, "the
ptiblic ideas were not at all concentrated, much less arranged
into any new system or form of government, which would
obviate these evils. Under the circumstances, I offered this
Dissertation to the public." In that Dissertation, Pelatiah
Webster presented, as a free gift to the great country that has
forgotten him, the new system or form of government which
passed, through the four "plans" offered in the Federal Con-
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vention of 1787,14 into the existing constitution of the United
States. Certainly no more "wonderful work was ever struck off
at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." As an evi-
dence of his highly practical temper the fact should be men-
tioned in conclusion that having been a successful merchant his
pet hobby seems to have been to create a Department of Com-
merce in close touch with Congress. He said: "I therefore
humbly propose, if the merchants in the several States are dis-
posed to send delegates from their body to meet and attend the
sittings of Congress, that they shall be permitted to form a
chamber of commerce, and their advice to Congress be demand-
ed and admitted concerning all bills before Congress, asfar as
the same may affect the trade of the States."
In his criticisms made in 179i of the work of the Federal
Convention he said that its failure to accept that suggestion
was a great mistake. The very recent creation of a Depart-
ment of Commerce and Labor has at last effectuated his idea.
Only through the vista of receding years can such an epoch-
making mind be viewed in all its grandeur. What signifies a
century of neglect passed in the midst of the "momentous con-
sequences" his work was wrought! His time is at hand; his
fame is as safe and as certain as the immortality of thought and
the unerring' justice of the tribunal of history. His abiding
faith in the justice of that tribunal he clearly expressed when
he said: "But if any of these questions should in future time
become objects of discussion, neither the vast dignity of the Con-
vention, nor the low unnoticed state of myself, will be at all
considered in the debates; the merits of the matter, and the
interests connected with or arising out of it, will alone dictate
the decision." The humanly impbssible and miraculous theory
which has heretofore serenely assumed that the greatest and most
unique of all political inventions had no inventor, cannot sur-
vive a method of historical investigation that undertakes to
demonstrate that beneath every shell there is an animal, behind
every document there is a man. Hannis Taylor.
x4. At a later time a grave controversy arose as to "the singularly
minute coincides between the draught of the Federal government communi-
cated by Mr. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, to Mr. Adams, Secretary
of States," the Virginia plan, and the constitution as finally adopted. Every
explanation of the "singularly minute coincides" was given but the plain and
obvious one-allfour filans were alike because they were taken from a
common source. See Rives' Life and Times of Madison, vol. ii. pp. 353-357.
